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This study examines the spatial dependence, direct and indirect effects of fiscal 
decentralisation on the provincial economic growth of Pakistan. Due to spatial dependence, 
spatial econometric technique is applied on the augmented growth of Mankiw, et al. (1992) by 
incorporating the fiscal decentralisation variable in the theoretical framework. The empirical 
analysis is based on the spatial panel data set, which is used from 1990 to 2011 of provinces. 
Model is selected on basis of specific to general and general to specific approach, and decided 
two-way fixed effects Spatial Durbin model (SDM) is appropriate for our data. We have 
estimated the SDM by maximum likelihood (bias corrected and random effect) estimation 
technique, otherwise, if we applied OLS and ignore the spillover effect which makes our 
estimated parameters biased and inconsistent. Results show that revenue decentralisation has 
positive, while expenditure decentralisation has negative effect to provincial economic growth. 
Spillover effects are found to be significant in case of revenue decentralisation and 
insignificant in case of expenditure. Negative and insignificant spillover effect of expenditure 
decentralisation is due to weak institutions, lack of intra governmental competition, and 
absence of political vision which may increase the level of corruption and less accountability.  
On the basis of econometric analysis, it may be suggested that federal government should 
transfer the resources to provinces as determined in the 18th amendment, and it is the 
responsibility of provincial government to train their officials in the area of professional 
ethics, technical and administrative skills by different programmes. 
JEL Classification:  C31, C33, H3, H50 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal decentralisation is the transfer of fiscal responsibilities from central to sub-
central governments in devolving its functions of taxes and expenditures. It is considered 
as a sign of efficiency from few decades. Owing to this approach the local governments 
can independently figure out their problems, rather consulting to federal government 
[Oates (1972, 1999)]. This is the basic logic behind the Tiebout hypothesis (1956).  
Pakistan has a federal government structure, in which the resources are distributed 
among the provinces which have a significant impact on income, and living standard of the 
people. The NFC (National Finance Commission) award is considered as a step toward 
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federalism [Mustafa (2011)], which makes mechanism to distribute resources from center to 
the provinces, and Provinces Finance Commission (PFC) for distribution of resources from 
provinces to district level. The 7th NFC award is the gesture of hope and sacrifice which 
strengthen federation, and realising the people that other provinces are equally caring about 
their development [Mustafa (2011)]. In this award provinces are granted more financial 
resources not based on population only but also on the regional backwardness.  
 
Fiscal Share of Provinces, by 1995–2010 
Provinces 
Ratio of Revenue and 
Expenditure to Total 
Share 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Punjab Rev 0.13115 0.14463 0.1504 0.15876 
 Exp 0.13253 0.13325 0.12939 0.15264 
Sindh Rev 0.06516 0.07906 0.07059 0.07241 
 Exp 0.06754 0.07284 0.8399 0.08554 
KPK Rev 0.04499 0.05027 0.04347 0.04157 
 Exp 0.04803 0.04871 0.0229 0.04465 
Balochistan Rev 0.02587 0.02621 0.02846 0.02956 
 Exp 0.02322 0.02297 0.01778 0.01923 
 
Punjab has more revenue and expenditure share than any other provinces, which 
have an upward trend from 1995 to 2010. In addition 18th amendment has been done to 
bridge the gap between provinces and federation disparities. In this amendment provinces 
are given more autonomy, and financial resources are devolved by some more extent, 
which will strengthen the process of decentralisation in Pakistan.  
Fiscal decentralisation results in stronger intergovernmental competition due to 
spatial dependence one region’s government policy may affect the other regions 
[Crowley and Sobel (2011)]. Moreover, each province provides the local public good in 
his jurisdiction. The public goods benefit to those citizen in which province they are 
located, but may also have favourable spillover to the other provinces. Therefore, the 
spillover effects among the provinces motivate us to check the direct and spillover effect 
of fiscal decentralisation on provincial economic growth in Pakistan.  
Objective of this study is to answer the following questions:  
(1) Is spatial dependence (spatial interaction effect) exist among the provinces of 
Pakistan? 
(2) What is the direct and indirect (spillover) effects of fiscal decentralisation on 
provincial economic growth (real per capita income).  
(3) Are these effects (direct and spillover) exist, significantly or not? 
This study is organised as: Section 2, reviews theoretical and empirical literature 
on decentralisation and economic growth in case of spatial and non-spatial econometrics.  
Section 3, discusses the empirical model, econometrics methodology and data. Section 4, 
empirically examines the role of fiscal decentralisation, and provinces economic growth 
and discusses the findings. Section 5 concludes the results, gives policy implementation, 
limitation and way forward of the study.  
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2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Empirical Review of Decentralisation and Economic Growth 
On the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth from 
cross country level to group of countries, there is extensive literature. World is divided 
into two groups, high income industrialised countries and developing countries, and 
different empirical studies in both group found different results.  
Zhang and Zou (1998) used methodology of Barro (1990), Lvine and Renelt 
(1992) and Davoodi and Zou (1998) to find the relationship between decentralisation and 
economic growth for China, they estimated panel data fixed effect model of 28 provinces 
(from 1980-1992) by using the estimation technique generalised least square. They find 
negative and significant impact of the fiscal decentralisation on the economic growth.   
Jin, et al. (2005) re-examine the study of Zhang and Zou (1998) including the 
variable of volatility, they extended the empirical methodology of Zhang and Zou (1998) 
by including (data from 1982 to 1992 of 29 provinces of China) the variable of dummy 
that capture the effect of a national macroeconomics fluctuations. They conclude that the 
fiscal decentralisation promotes economic growth of Chinese provinces.   
Xie, et al. (1999) used the theoretical model for decentralisation that is elaborated 
in Davoodi and Zou (1998) for 50 American states (from time period 1948-1994), 
empirically they applied time series methodology by OLS estimation. They concluded 
that existing expenditure share for local and state governments in USA are consistent 
with the objective of maximising the growth of the economy, the effect of 
decentralisation is highly insignificant.  
Lin and Liu (2000) used the methodology of Mankiw, et al. (1992) and they 
specify a model of growth of Solow (1956). They used data of 28 provinces of China for 
the time period 1970-1993, their empirically analysis based on provinces panel data, with 
two way (provinces and time dummies) fixed effects. They found, the fiscal 
decentralisation contributes economic growth in China, significantly, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that fiscal decentralisation can enhance economic efficiency.  
Zhang and Zou (2001) developed a new model with accordance Barro (1990) and 
Zhang and Zou (1998) that connects the different public spending categories in the diverse 
government levels with the economic growth of the region. They selected 28 provinces of 
China (from 1987-1993) and 16 major states of India (from1970-1994). In empirical analysis, 
they applied provincial fixed effect model (in case of China) and regression analysis based on 
panel data, with estimation a five year forward-moving average of real per capita income 
growth (in case of India). They concluded, in case of China, as in Zhang and Zou (1998), a 
negative and significant association between province economic growth and fiscal 
decentralisation. However, in case of India, they found a positive and significant association 
between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth.    
Behnisch, et al. (2003) conducted a study in Germany (from time period 1950-
1990), but they did not make any reference to their theoretical model. They applied linear 
and time series regression analysis (further details are not available). The analysis shows 
an inverse significance of state expenditure, and therefore, indicates polices among state 
level governments as part of cooperative federalism is not efficient with regard of 
productivity growth.  
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Vazquez and McNab (2003) used panel data set (from 1972-1997) for 52 
transitional countries. They examined direct and indirect relationship among fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth and macroeconomic stability. They concluded that 
decentralisation leads to reduce the rate of inflation, and positively effect on economic 
growth through its positive impact on macroeconomic stability.   
Desai, et al. (2003) used the regression analysis of (80 Russian) regions and 
average data with time specific effects as a base of simultaneous regression models. They 
applied three stage least squares (3SLS) and OLS with panel-corrected standard error 
estimation. They do not mention the reference of any theoretical pattern. Thus, the proxy 
for sub-national (tax retention) fiscal autonomy has a positive impact on the output 
regaining of regions since the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
Feld, et al. (2004) used the methodology of neoclassical growth model of Mankiw, 
et al. (1992) on panel data for the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998. In their empirical 
study the effect of diverse instruments of fiscal federalism on economic performance 
measured by GDP per capita. The results concluded that matching grants have a negative 
impact on economic performance, while tax competition is not least harmful to economic 
performance, competition among the different sub-national governments enhance 
efficiency.  
Akai, et al. (2004) provided the theory (from Barro (1990) analytical framework) 
that describes how to decentralisation effect economic growth under different structure of 
regional complementary. They estimated panel data model with time and state fixed 
effects of fifty states of USA over the period of 1992-1997, which support the theoretical 
specification of the production function, by using the technique of maximum likelihood 
estimation. They observed the “hump-shaped” association between fiscal decentralisation 
and economic growth.  
Jin and Zou (2005) applied the methodology of Barro (1990) and Davoodi and 
Zou (1998) in a panel dataset for 30 provinces in China to examine the association 
between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth over two stages of fiscal 
decentralisation in China: first, 1979–1993 under the fiscal contract system, and second, 
1994–1999 under the tax assignment system. In their empirical analysis, they estimated 
the coefficients with fixed-effects with correction for panel heteroskedasticity and panel 
serial correlation. They concluded, for time period 1979 to 1993, results suggest, that 
revenue decentralisation encourage revenue mobilisation from local sources,  expenditure 
centralisation enhance growth, because the central government spends more efficiently 
than the provinces, and for second time period from 1994 to 1999, results suggest that at 
a certain level of expenditure decentralisation, more revenue centralisation promotes 
economic growth in China.     
Carrion-i-Silvestre, et al. (2006) analysed the influence of the Spanish fiscal 
decentralisation on economic growth at aggregate and regional level. They followed the 
methodology of Xie, et al. (1999) based on Davoodi and Zou (1998), take the data set of 
aggregate and regional level of 17 Autonomous Communities from 1980 to 1998 and 
1991 to 1996 respectively. On their panel data estimation they conclude that the Spanish 
decentralisation process has a positive effect on both aggregate and regional economic 
growth.  
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Akai and Sakata (2007) used same theoretical model applied by Xie, et al. (1999), 
based on the pattern of Davoodi and Zou (1998). They applied OLS and Fixed Effect 
Model with time dummies, on the panel data of 50 states of USA (from 1992 to 1997), 
their estimated coefficients on fiscal decentralisation is significant and have a positive 
effect on economic growth.  
Rodríguez‐Pose, et al. (2009), used the regression model based on methodology of 
Levineand Renelt (1992) to investigate the significance of fiscal decentralisation in 
sixteen Central and Eastern European countries. They applied panel data approach with 
dynamic effects over the 1990–2004 period of time, findings says expenditure 
decentralisation has a negative effect on economic growth due to the weak institution 
structure in many of countries and in case of decentralisation of revenues, they 
investigated that if revenues are decentralised at sub-national level their own revenue 
source behave better to local public demands and promote economic efficiency.  
 
Empirical Review in Case of Pakistan 
Malik, et al. (2006) investigated the positive association between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth, they use time series data from 1972 to 2005 and 
Ordinary Least Square estimation method is applied.   
Iqbal (2013) analysed the effect of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth and 
macroeconomic stability by using the endogenous growth model. In his analysis time 
series data is used from 1972-2010 and Generalise Method of Moment technique is 
applied. It is concluded by him that revenue and expenditure decentralisation has positive 
and negative effect on economic growth respectively. The reason of negative effect of 
expenditure decentralisation is weak institution and administrative framework at 
provinces level.  
 
Decentralisation, Economic Growth, Spillover Effects and Spatial Econometrics 
Spatial econometrics is the advancement in econometrics literature which captures 
the spatial effect due to spatial autocorrelation [Yang and Zheng (2010)].  
Yamoah (2007) used the growth model of Carlino and Mills (1987) to check 
the effect of decentralisation on economic growth in three thousand counties of forty 
six states of USA. In her study she take cross sectional data, and result indicate that 
fiscal decentralisation have negative effect on economic growth, spatial spillovers in 
county government decision making does not investigate and this limitation is 
acknowledge by her, and give way forward of new research in the area of spatial 
econometrics. 
Tosun and Yilmaz (2010) applied the panel data (1976-2001) and cross-sectional 
spatial regression analysis in 67 and 81 provinces in Turkey respectively. In cross 
sectional regression analysis there exists spatial correlation among the contiguous 
provinces (spatial effect incorporate in regression analysis due to this reason) and the 
model of spatial dependence account for any direct effect of spatial neighbour and 
spillover effects, hence, it is concluded that decentralisation contracting positive effect on 
economic growth through greater degree of competition among the provinces 
government. 
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Hammond and Tosun (2011) investigated the impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
economic growth in counties of USA. Their sample size divide into metropolitan counties 
and non-metropolitan counties (period from 1970 to 2000). Since they use county-level 
data then spatial spill-overs across counties exist, and these spill-over effects which imply 
that growth shocks to one county may be transferred feedback effect to other counties 
nearby, and will basis the residual variance in an OLS regression to be non-spherical. To 
correct this problem they used spatial error model in order to distinguish between 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan impacts. They estimates that 10  percent increase in 
revenue centralisation in metropolitan counties causes the decrease in long rune per 
capita income growth of 0.28 percent, and no correlation between decentralisation and 
non-metropolitan economic growth exist. This recommends that metropolitan fiscal 
decentralisation benefits long-run income growth. It also advises that generating revenue 
in a decentralised way makes the county a more attractive. Therefore, they examine 
significant positive spillover growth shocks to other counties, which suggests that 
counties whose neighbour grow faster than expected, to grow faster than expected.  
Zheng, et al. (2013) took 21 province data (from time period 1994-2006) to investigate 
the supply of healthcare expenditures, which  causes to slow down economic growth from last 
two decades. They use spatial panel data econometrics and find that the supply of healthcare 
resources is negatively related to the degree of decentralisation. It is credited to the presence of 
strategic alternatives (spillover) in healthcare spending across city governments. 
 
Conclusion 
Effect of decentralisation on economic growth is diverse in different regions. This 
difference exist on some extent due to misspecification of the model, because regional 
governments are interlinked on base of strategies and  boarders, the act of one 
government have feedback effect (spillover effect) to another. If spatial dependence and 
spillover effect are not account for then they could lead to biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates [LeSage (1998)]. In case of Pakistan there is not conducted the study 
of fiscal decentralisation and its effect on economic growth at provinces level, where 
provinces effect their neighbours significantly.  
 
3.  DATA AND ECONOMETRICS METHODOLOGY 
Due to spatial dependence, spatial panel data econometric will be applied on the 
modified theoretical framework of Mankiw, et al. (1992) by incorporating the 
decentralisation variable.  Estimation is performed by employing maximum likelihood 
technique instead of OLS method to obtain unbiased and consistent parameters in the 
presence of spillover effect. Therefore, specified Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) is: 
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or in matrix form 
ttitttt WXXWYy   … … … … (1a) 
Where, W is weight matrix, and is coefficients of spatial interaction effect of dependent 
and independent variables, respectively.  
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W Matrix and Normalising W Matrix 
W representing an n  n spatial weight matrix (in case of cross sectional data) of 
binary numbers, in which one is assign for neighbour, and zero is assign to prevent a 
region to the neighbor of itself [LeSage and Pace (2009)], in our case study (of Pakistan) 
we have four regions (Punjab, Sind, KPK and Balochistan). Where each column 
represent one region, 1st for Punjab, 2nd for Sindh, 3rd for KPK and 4th for Balochistan.   
W =   












0111
1001
1001
1110
                  WRN  =   












033.033.033.0
5.0005.0
5.0005.0
33.033.033.00
 
As another way, W might be normalised in such a way that the elements of each 
column sum to one. There is a point that the column elements of a spatial W matrix show 
the impact of a particular unit on all other units, while the row elements of spatial W 
matrix display the on a specific unit by all other units. Therefore, column normalisation 
has the effect, the impact of each region on all other regions is equalised, while row 
normalisation (WRN) has the effect, the impact of a particular region on all other regions 
[Elhorst (2014)].  
 
Data Description and Variable Construction 
Data which used in this study is at provinces level (from 1990 to 2011) of Pakistan.   
 
Table 3.1 
Data Description 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable (y) Real per capita income of provinces (base = 1999-00) 
Revenue Decentralisation (rd) 
)( federalincludingvenueReTotal
venueReovincesPr
 
Expenditure Decentralisation (ed) 
)( federalincludingvenueReTotal
enditureExpovincesPr
 
Human Capital (h) Per capita health and education expenditure of 
provinces 
Capital (k) Per capita capital expenditure of provinces 
 
Data of provincial GDP is estimated and disaggregated by Shaheen Malik 
(Research Analyst at unit SASEP) for World Bank. He used three traditional approaches 
(to estimate GDP), production, expenditure, and income. More specifically, where detail 
provincial data were available, i.e. agriculture, mining and quarrying, whole sale and 
retail trade and manufacturing, sectorial value added were estimated using the production 
approach. The expenditure approach was used to compute value added of construction, 
electricity and gas distribution, ownership of dwellings, defence subsectors and public 
admiration. Moreover, the income approach was applied to value added to transport, 
communication and storage, banking and insurance, and services sub-sectors. The 
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analysis of estimation has been applied to facilitate the economic assessment for two 
provinces reports: Development Issue and Prospect of Balochistan and Public 
Expenditure Review for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.  
We are also using the education and health expenditures as proxy of human 
capital and the capital expenditure of provincial governments as a proxy for capital, 
data on variables are taken from annual Pakistan Statistical Year Book. For 
transforming the data into per unit form, provinces population has been used, which 
is collected from the Labour Force Survey, published by Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 
(PBS). In addition,  data of provincial revenue and expenditure is also taken from 
annual Pakistan Statistical Year Book, and the calculation of  decentrali sation 
(revenue and expenditure) variables, obtain by the ratio of provinces revenue and 
expenditure to total revenues and expenditures of the provincial government  
(including federal) respectively [Oates (1972)].  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we empirically analyse the different spatial econometrics models, 
by using the spatial panel data that explain the provincial economics performance and 
decentralisation in Pakistan (from 1990 to 2011). The dependent variable is real per 
capita income and explanatory variables are decentralisation (revenue or expenditure), 
capital and human capital. All variables are in log form, so our specified SDM is equation 
(1 or 1a), which we can convert to non-spatial models easily by eliminating the spatial 
interaction effects, with spatial effect or/and time period fixed effects, and estimation is 
done in Matlab software.  
 
Results of Revenue Decentralisation 
 
Table 4.1.1 
Estimation Results of Revenue Decentralisation Using Panel Data Models 
without Spatial Interaction Effects 
Determinants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pooled 
OLS 
Spatial fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Spatial and Time-
period Fixed Effects 
Log(rd) 0.085 
(1.407) 
–0.032  
(–0.260) 
0.162  
(2.638) 
0.144  
(1.065) 
Log(h) 0.062 
(1.176) 
0.039  
(0.817) 
0.025  
(0.325) 
0.045  
(0.655) 
Log(k) 0.222 
(7.165) 
0.186  
(6.39) 
0.332  
(5.57) 
0.180 
(2.558) 
Intercept 8.637 
(27.58) 
   
 0.111 0.081 0.092  0.071 
 0.428    0.578 0.517 0.631 
LogL –24.905 –12.118 –17.758 –6.499 
LM Spatial lag 5.669 4.96 7.684 14.565 
LM Spatial error 3.517 5.596 12.650 17.140 
Robust LM Spatial lag 2.346 0.009 7.386 8.557 
Robust LM Spatial error 0.194 0.638 12.352 11.13 
Note: t-value in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.1 accounts the estimation results of revenue decentralisation on 
economic growth when adopting a non-spatial panel data model. To check which specific 
effect should include in model (spatial or/and time), we use likelihood ratio test. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis, the spatial fixed effects are jointly non-significant, the 
result (LR=25.57, with 4 degrees of freedom [df],) indicate that null hypothesis is rejected 
and we should extend our model by including spatial specific effects. Similarly, the 
hypothesis that the spatial and time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant must be 
rejected (LR=37.00, 25 df). Results of these tests justify the extension of the model with 
spatial and time period fixed effects that is also known as the two ways fixed effects 
model [Baltagi (2008)].   
Therefore, inclusion of spatial and time-period fixed effects, our next step is to 
determine whether the spatial lag model or the spatial error model is more suitable. For 
the inclusion of spatial interaction effects we are using classic LM tests, and both the 
hypothesis of no spatially serial correlated error term and the hypothesis of no spatially 
lagged dependent variable must be significant at 5 percent and 1 percent level of 
significance. When using the robust LM tests, the hypothesis of no spatially lagged 
dependent variable may not be rejected at 5 percent as well as 1 percent significance. 
However, hypothesis of no spatially serial correlated error term must still be rejected at 5 
percent and 1 percent level of significance.  
Up to now, our test results point to the spatial error specification of the two-way 
fixed effect model because LM spatial error test is more significant than LM spatial lag 
test. But there is ambiguity to selection of the model because both tests reject their null 
hypotheses in favour of their alternatives. Nevertheless, if a non-spatial model on the 
basis of robust LM tests is rejected in favour of spatial error model or the spatial lag 
model, we should be careful to select one of these two models [Elhorst (2014)]. The 
LeSage and Pace (2009) recommend to consider the spatial Durbin model when this 
situation exist. The first hypothesis whether the spatial Durbin model can be simplified to 
the spatial lag model, and the second examines whether it simplified to the spatial error 
model [Elhorst (2014)]. The test statistics of both models follow Chi squared distribution 
with K degree of freedom.  
The spatial Durbin model best describes the data if both hypotheses and are 
rejected. On the other hand, if the first hypothesis not able to be rejected, the spatial lag 
model then best specify the data, the robust LM tests also specify the spatial lag model. 
Similarly, if second hypothesis can’t be rejected, the spatial error model the best 
describes the data, provided that robust LM tests also specify the spatial error model. 
Therefore, one of these conditions is not satisfied, i.e. if the robust LM tests point to 
another model than the LR/Wald test, the Spatial Durbin model should be adopted 
[Elhorst (2014)]. Because, this (SDM) model generalises both the spatial lag and the 
spatial error model. In model specification criteria, the spatial econometric literature is 
divided regarding to apply specific-to-general or general-to-specific approach [Elhorst 
(2014)].  
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Table 4.1.2 
Estimation Results of Revenue Decentralisation: Spatial Durbin Model  
Specification with Spatial and Time-period Specific Effects 
Determinants 
(1) (2) (3) 
Spatial and 
Time-period 
Fixed effects 
Spatial and Time-
period 
Fixed effects 
bias-corrected 
Random Spatial 
effects, fixed 
time-period 
effects 
W*log(y) –0.913          
(–10.69) 
–0.769           
(–7.659) 
–0.673           
(–6.47) 
Log(rd) 0.744            
(9.110) 
0.741            
(7.570) 
0.724            
(8.30) 
Log(h) 0.072            
(1.691) 
0.074            
(1.433) 
0.076           
(1.503) 
Log(k) 0.162           
(3.608) 
0.168           
(3.112) 
0.163           
(3.137) 
W*Log(rd) 2.264           
(8.896) 
2.49            
(8.235) 
2.493          
(8.634) 
W*Log(h) 0.147           
(1.520) 
0.159           
(1.367) 
0.173          
(1.508) 
W*Log(k) 0.598           
(4.282) 
0.655           
(3.936) 
0.557          
(3.636) 
Phi 
  
0.209          
(2.039) 
 0.013 0.018 0.018 
 0.929 0.919 0.870 
Corrected R2 0.537 0.562 0.436 
LogL 39.518 39.518 NA 
Wald Test Spatial lag 84.276     
(p=0.0000) 
72.322    
(p=0.0000) 
81.10    
(p=0.0000) 
LR Test Spatial lag 64.027     
(p=0.0000) 
64.027    
(p=0.0000) 
NA 
Wald Test Spatial error 33.993     
(p=0.0000) 
35.356    
(p=0.0000) 
43.522  
(p=0.0000) 
LR Test Spatial lag error 46.774     
(p=0.0000) 
46.774    
(p=0.0000) 
NA 
Note: t-value in parenthesis. Hausman test-statistic, degrees of freedom and probability = 2.987, 7, 0.8862. 
 
In above testing procedure we mix both approaches. Firstly, we estimate non-
spatial model to test it’s against spatial lag and spatial error model (specific to general 
approach). In case of non-spatial model is rejected then spatial Durbin model is 
estimated, and this can test to simplified to the spatial lag or spatial error model (general 
to specific approach). If both approaches identify same model either spatial lag or spatial 
error model, it is safe to select this one which model describes best to data. In other hand 
that is the best to adopt more general model (SDM), when non-spatial model is specified 
in favour of spatial lag or spatial error model and spatial Durbin model not identify it. 
The results which we are obtained by estimating the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) are 
reported in Table 4.1.2. The first column indicates the results when model is estimated by 
using direct approach and the second column shows the bias corrected coefficient. These 
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results show that the difference between parameters estimate of independent variable (X) 
and are small through bias corrected estimation. But on another hand, the coefficient of 
the independent variables (WX) and the spatially lagged dependent variables (WY) seem 
quite sensitive to bias correction procedure [Elhorst (2014)]. 
We have estimated three models (SDM) by different technique (in three columns), 
first we check which model specification is the best our data set, either fixed effect model 
is appropriated or random effect. Hausman’s specification test can use to test the random 
effects against fixed effects model. The results (h=2.987, 7 df, p > 0.05 and 0.10) indicate 
that random effects model does not rejected against fixed effect.  
The Wald test (43.52, p=0.000) indicate that the hypothesis whether spatial Durbin 
model (SDM) can be simplified to the spatial error model (SEM),  must be rejected, 
similarly the hypothesis that SDM can be simplified to SAR model,  must be rejected 
(Wald test: 81.10, p=0.0000). This indicates that both the SEM and the SAR must be 
rejected in favour of the spatial Durbin model.  
In this study we concentrate on decentralisation variable as a direct and indirect 
effect. The coefficient of revenue decentralisation in the non-spatial model is 
insignificant but has an expected sign. In the two-way fixed effects form of this model 
(the last column of Table 4.1.1), higher revenue decentralisation increase regional 
income positively but effect again is insignificant. In other way, we have discussed 
(specification procedure of model) that spatial and time period specific effects are not 
correlate to explanatory variables, and these effects are consider as random (reason to 
specifying random effect model).  However, due to spatial interaction (both in 
dependent and independent variables) the specification of spatial Durbin random 
effects model is found to be more appropriate, and the elasticity’s in non-spatial and 
two-way fixed effect SDM consider as biased (due to acceptance of the null hypothesis 
of Hausman test). In the third column of the estimation results of SDM, the elasticity of 
revenue decentralisation is 0.724 which is significantly overestimated as we compare it 
to non-spatial fixed effects models. Whereas, the coefficient estimates in the non-
spatial model represent the marginal effect of a change in revenue decentralisation on 
provincial per capita income (economic growth) but the coefficients of spatial Durbin 
model (SDM) do not. 
 
Table 4.1.3 
Direct and Indirect (Spillover) Effects Estimates Based on the Parameter 
Estimates of the Spatial Durbin Model Reported in Table 4.1.2. 
Determinants 
(1) (2) (3) 
Spatial and 
Time-Period 
Fixed Effects 
Spatial and Time-Period 
Fixed Effects 
Bias-corrected 
Random Spatial Effects, 
Fixed Time-period 
Effects 
Direct Effect Log(rd) 0.087 
(0.810) 
0.145 
(1.269) 
0.203 
(2.027) 
Indirect Effect Log(rd) 1.495 
(7.264) 
1.70 
(6.928) 
1.732 
(7.087) 
Total Effect Log(rd) 1.583 
(7.970) 
1.845 
(7.052) 
1.935 
(6.914) 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Direct and indirect (spillover) effects:  (I-)-1   are calculated.  
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For this reason, we should use the direct and indirect effects of estimates and these 
effects are reported in above Table 4.1.3. The logic that the direct effects of the 
independent variables are different from their parameter estimates is due to feedback, 
which arises in response of impacts passing through neighbouring provinces and back to 
the provinces themselves. These feedback effects are relatively due to parameter of 
spatial lagged dependent variable [W*log(y)] that turns out to be negative and significant, 
and partially in result of the parameter of the spatially lagged of the independent variable 
itself.  The coefficient of latter turns out to be positive and significant for the revenue 
decentralisation [W*log (rd)].The direct and indirect (spillover) effects estimates are 
obtained by computing (I-)
-1
.  
In random effects spatial Durbin model (column (3) of Table 4.1.2) the direct effect 
of the revenue decentralisation variable appears to be 0.724. This means that the revenue 
decentralisation elasticity is 0.144 in the non-spatial model that is underestimating by 80 
percent. Since, the direct effect of the revenue decentralisation is 0.237 and its coefficient 
estimate is 0.724 its feedback amount represents the direct effect. Therefore, this feedback 
effects turn out relatively small. In another hand, the indirect (spillover) effects in non-
spatial model are equate to zero, the indirect effect of due to change in the explanatory 
variables in the spatial Durbin model appears to be 853.2 percent of the direct effect in case 
of revenue decentralisation, and this indirect effect is statistically significant on base of t-
statistics which calculated from a set of 1000 simulation parameter values. In other words, 
if the revenue decentralisation in a particular provinces changes, not only per capita income 
of that province itself, but also in that of its neighbouring provinces will change. Now move 
to the estimation results of expenditure decentralisation. 
 
Results of Expenditure Decentralisation  
 
Table 4.2.1 
Estimation Results of Expenditure Decentralisation Using Panel Data  
Models without Spatial Interaction Effects 
Determinants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pooled 
OLS 
Spatial 
fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Spatial and Time-
Period Fixed Effects 
Log(ed) 
0.088 (1.389) 
–0.246  
(0.1641) 
0.141 
 (2.179) 
–0.434 
 (–1.711) 
Log(h) 
0.067 (1.220) 
–1.080  
(0.873) 
0.009  
(0.127) 
0.092  
(1.278) 
Log(k) 0.230  
(7.04) 
0.174  
(5.706) 
0.348  
(5.438) 
0.130  
(1.733) 
Intercept 8.576 (27.26)    
 0.111 0.079 0.095 0.069 
 0.428    0.584 0.505 0.639 
LogL –24.930 –11.553 –18.829 –5.591 
LM Spatial Lag 5.533 5.815 6.423 13.501 
LM Spatial Error 3.409 5.409 9.731 14.636 
Robust LM Spatial Lag 2.315 0.538 16.366 3.281 
Robust LM Spatial Error 0.191 0.132 19.674 4.416 
Note: t-value in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.1 accounts the estimation results (of expenditure decentralisation), when 
adopting a non-spatial panel data model. To check which specific effects should include 
in model (spatial or/and time), we again use likelihood ratio test as we have used in case 
of revenue decentralisation. Thus, the null hypothesis, the spatial and time period fixed 
effects are jointly non-significant is rejected because LR=38.68 (with 25 df,) and we 
extend our model by including spatial and time specific effects.  
Our next step is to check the spatial interaction effects for specification of the model. 
The procedure of the selection of the model is also the same as we have discussed (in case 
of revenue decentralisation). For inclusion of spatial interaction effects, both hypotheses, no 
spatially serial correlated error term and the hypothesis of no spatially lagged dependent 
variable are significant at 5 percent and 1 percent level of significance because statistics of 
LM spatial lag and LM spatial error (see in fourth column of Table 4.2.1) are greater than 
the critical value (which is Chi (1) .01 value = 6.64). Therefore, we have applied both 
techniques specific to general and general to specific (as in revenue decentralisation is 
applied), and conclude that our specify model is Spatial Durbin Model (SDM).  
 
Table 4.2.2 
Estimation Results of Expenditure Decentralisation: Spatial Durbin Model  
Specification with Spatial and Time-Period Specific Effects 
Determinants 
(1) (2) (3) 
Spatial and Time-
period 
Fixed Effects 
Spatial and Time-
period 
Fixed Effects 
Bias-corrected 
Random Spatial 
Effects, Fixed 
Time-period 
Effects 
W*log(y) –0.864 
(–8.894) 
–0.683 
(–5.992) 
–0.706 
(–6.377) 
Log(ed) –0.482 
(-1.906) 
–0.473 
(-1.550) 
0.531 
(5.283) 
Log(h) 0.202 
(2.841) 
0.202 
(2.356) 
0.073 
(0.952) 
Log(k) 0.131 
(1.505) 
0.134 
(1.280) 
0.397 
(5.782) 
W*Log(ed) –0.540 
(–0.824) 
–0.484 
(–0.611) 
1.509 
(4.387) 
W*Log(h) 0.331 
(2.051) 
0.339 
(1.738) 
0.113 
(0.640) 
W*Log(k) 0.183 
(0.855) 
0.179 
(0.696) 
0.603 
(3.709) 
Phi 
  
0.996 
(2.753) 
 0.042 0.047 0.047 
 0.824 0.796 0.675 
Corrected R
2
 0.132 0.140 0.428 
LogL 8.980 8.979 NA 
Wald Test Spatial Lag 10.301 
(p=0.0162) 
7.098 
(p=0.0688) 
38.995 
(p=0.0000) 
LR Test Spatial Lag 6.846 
(p=0.0769) 
6.846 
(p=0.0769) 
NA 
Wald Test Spatial Error 2.871 
(p=0.4120) 
2.974 
(p=0.3956) 
18.720 (p=0.0000) 
LR Test Spatial Lag Error 1.1596 
(p=0.7627) 
1.159 
(p= 0.7627) 
NA 
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In Table 4.2.2 we again estimate three models (SDM) in case of expenditure 
decentralisation by different specification and technique (see column of Table 4.2.2). We 
check first, which model specification is the best describes our data set, either fixed effect 
model is appropriated or random effect. For this we apply the Hausman’s specification test to 
check either random effects model is appropriate or fixed effects. The result (h=16.18,  7 df, p 
< 0.05) indicate that random effects model is rejected in favor of fixed effects, as a result we 
ignore the third column. Expenditure decentralisation in specification of random effect model, 
positively affect the real per capita income of the provinces, but these results are biased due to 
misspecification of the model, in other hand, the correct specification of the model, 
expenditure decentralisation effect negatively to provinces economic growth.  
The coefficient of expenditure decentralisation in the non-spatial (two-way fixed 
effects) model (see the last column of Table 4.2.1) show the negative association to 
provinces income, it indicates that if higher expenditure are decentralised it will decrease 
the regional income, but this effect is insignificant.  However, due to spatial interaction 
(both in dependent and independent variables) the spatial Durbin fixed effects model is 
found to be more appropriate, and the elasticity in non-spatial and random effects SDM 
consider are biased (due to reject the null hypothesis of Hausman test).  
We are using bias corrected estimates for interpretation and the reason to chosen 
the bias correction estimates have been given in section of revenue decentralisation. In 
the second column of the estimation results of SDM, the elasticity of expenditure 
decentralisation is –0.472 which is insignificant, it is overestimate if we compare it to the 
elasticity coefficient of non-spatial two way-fixed effects model.  
 
Table 4.2.3 
Direct and Indirect (Spillover) Effects Estimates Based on the Parameter  
Estimates of the Spatial Durbin Model Reported in Table 4.2.2 
Determinants 
(1) (2) (3) 
Spatial and 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Spatial and Time-
period 
Fixed Effects 
Bias-corrected 
Random Spatial 
Effects, 
Fixed Time-period 
Effects 
Direct Effect Log(ed) –0.440 
(–1.731) 
–0.423 
(–1.506) 
0.216 
(2.89) 
Indirect Effect Log(ed) –0.132 
(–0.267) 
–0.133 
(–0.232) 
0.989 
4.036) 
Total Effect Log(ed) –  0.572 
(–1.234) 
–0.556 
(–0.930) 
1.206 
(4.578) 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Direct and indirect (spillover) effects:  (I-)-1   are calculated.  
 
In addition to find the direct and indirect effects we only concern the expenditure 
decentralisation variable. In expenditure decentralisation, the direct (feedback) and 
indirect effects (see Table 4.2.3) are not exist, because the t-value are insignificant 
respectively. The reason of insignificant direct and spillover effects is weak institutions 
and less administrative and political autonomy among the government of the provinces, 
and that is also a reason of negative effect of expenditure decentralisation [Rodríguez‐
Pose, et al. (2009) and Iqbal (2013)].  
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5.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given study analysed the spatial (correlation) interaction effects, the effect of 
fiscal decentralisation on the provinces economic growth, and also analysed the direct 
and spillover effects. The estimated result in case of revenue decentralisation showed that 
there exist spatial interaction effects, positive effect of revenue decentralisation on 
provincial economic growth and found significant direct (feedback) and indirect 
(spillover) effects, due to heterogeneous governments in the provinces
1
 (from 1990 to 
2011), because revenue decentralisation generates positive externalities
2
 and further in 
case of human capital and capital labour ratio have positive association to provincial 
economic growth respectively. On the other hand, the result indicates (in case of 
expenditure decentralisation) that there exist spatial interaction effects, but has negative 
association with the provincial economic growth. In addition there exist no direct 
(feedback) and indirect (spillover) effects due to weak institutions
3
 and lack of intra 
governmental competition which may increase the level of corruption, less accountability 
and lack of political vision of the people. In expenditure decentralisation human capital 
and capital labour ratio have positive association to provincial economic growth. The 
coefficient of spatial lag of dependent variable has negative association to economic 
growth (due to boarder effect), when one province income increase it may affect the 
income of other provinces negatively because investment and business activity move to 
that province which is economically grow and in this case economic growth in other 
provinces may fall.  
There are few policy implications which construct from this study: 
(1) As our empirical results reveal that revenue decentralisation have positive 
direct and spillover effect on economic growth due to competition among the 
provincial government in given circumstances. Because by giving discretion to 
provincial government (in revenue generation) will increase the pace of 
economic growth in their region. Unfortunately, in 18th constitutional 
amendment many funds are move to provincial government but they are still in 
control of federal government. The Punjab government complaint against the 
federal government in Supreme Court that federal government is unwilling to 
handover its share.
4
 18th amendment gives the more autonomy to the 
provinces, which will leads to competition among the sub-national 
governments and this competition will leads to positive spillover. Therefore, it 
is the responsibility of federal government to move the resources to provinces, 
as determined under 18th amendment.  
(2) In case of expenditure decentralisation, it will be only effective when 
provinces have strong institutions, in which they have more administrative and 
accountability authority which leads to transparency, as a result, expenditure 
decentralisation can contribute positively to economic growth. Hence, 
Provinces government should take steps to teach and giving the training to 
 
1Not concern either there is democratic or dictatorship in centre.  
2 Iqbal, et al. (2013) “Decentralisation of revenue generation responsibilities generates positive 
externalities which increase the per capita income of the country”.  
3 Findings of Rodríguez‐Pose, et al. (2009) and Iqbal  (2013).  
4Dawn News (02/April/2015)  News link: http://www.dawn.com/news/1173391. 
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public officials in professional ethics, technical and administrative skills by 
different programs in order to get the significant positive impact of expenditure 
decentralisation on their economic growth.   
 
Limitation and Way Forward of the Study   
Due to unavailability of data we are not able to extend our study at district level, in 
which more spatial variation can be captured and results would be become more versatile. 
In this study we used fiscal decentralisation as a proxy of decentralisation by ignoring the 
political and administrative decentralisation. In addition, data of provincial GDP is not 
collected officially at the provincial government
5
 level, which is again an issue of 
reliability of data.  
The research can be extended to find the spatial effect of fiscal decentralisation on 
health sector, poverty and income inequality.  
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